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Abstract 
This article responds to recent calls to examine the development of professionalism through 
the lens of institutional theory. We investigate the development of the new professional 
service of executive remuneration consultancy (ERC) in the UK through the lens of 
institutional work. Specifically, drawing upon Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) and Suddaby 
and Viale (2011), we explore the relationship between macro-scale 
occupational/organizational and micro-scale individual-level dynamics of the ERC 
professional project and situate its development in relation to the broader field of executive 
remuneration practices. We show that the institutional work of creating the new professional 
project is contested and that the ERC development may be better understood as part of 
broader efforts to create and maintain the institution of executive pay-setting practices. We 
argue that the institutional work lens has the potential to produce a more nuanced 
understanding of the internal dynamics of the ERC professionalization process and its role in 
reconfiguring broader institutional arrangements. By exploring the analytical purchase of the 
concept of institutional work, the article contributes to the emerging body of empirical 
evidence outlining the potential of (neo-) institutional approaches to offer a more productive 
understanding of contemporary professionalism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent changes in the organization of professional work (see Muzio, Ackroyd, and Chanlat 
2008) have inspired a resurgence of interest in the study of new, knowledge-intensive 
professional occupations,1 particularly those emerging within large professional service 
organizations, for example, management consulting, HR, project management, executive 
search, and so on (Clarke 2000; Fincham 2006; Groß and Kieser 2006; McKenna 2006; 
Morris et al. 2006; Hodgson 2008; Beaverstock, Hall, and Faulconbridge 2010; Kipping 
2011; Muzio et al. 2011). Although existing research offers valuable insights into new 
patterns of professionalism it tends to assess the ‘success’ of new professional projects 
against ‘traditional’ liberal professions and typically concludes new professional projects to 
be ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ (see Muzio,Kirkpatrick, and Kipping 2011). Muzio, Brock, and 
Suddaby (2013: 703) have argued that such analysis, underpinned by sociology of the 
professions approaches, lacks theoretical dynamism, and the capacity to account for the 
development of new professional occupations; instead they have called for the application of 
a neo-institutional lens to explore these processes. Following this call, this article aims to 
strengthen the empirical foundations of the institutionalist approach to professionalism 
(Leicht and Fennell 2008; Scott 2008; Suddaby and Viale 2011; Muzio, Brock, and Suddaby 
2013) by offering an exploratory analysis of the development of the new professional service 
of executive remuneration consultancy (ERC) in the UK through the lens of institutional 
work. 
 
Recent studies that explore professions through the institutional work lens have offered 
interesting insights into how traditional professions engage in the work of institutional 
maintenance in order to preserve or repair their professional power (e.g. Currie et al. 2012; 
Micelotta and Washington 2013), how professional organizations reconfigure institutional 
fields (e.g. Kipping and Kirkpatrick 2013) and how professionals shape organizational 
processes (e.g. Daudigeos 2013; Empson et al. 2013). However, empirical studies of the 
institutional work of creation of new professional projects are still relatively scarce. 
Moreover, much existing research of new knowledge-intensive occupations centres on the 
macro-level analysis of professionalization patterns (e.g. Fincham 2006; Beaverstock, Hall, 
and Faulconbridge 2010; Kipping 2011; Muzio et al. 2011). A notable exception is McCann 
et al.’s (2013) study of the work of paramedics, which exposes how the agency of individual 
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workers may become more significant than the collective efforts of professional elites in 
shaping the development of that professional project. McCann et al.’s (2013) research shows 
that it is essential to account for the role of individual professionals in order to understand the 
complexity of professionalization of new occupational groups, and that the concept of 
institutional work allows us to account for individual agency (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 
2009). In this article, we aim to extend our understanding of the relationship between 
individual- and occupational level dynamics of professionalization through unpacking the 
internal tensions and complexities of the development of ERC. Drawing on Lawrence and 
Suddaby’s (2006) classification of the forms of institutional work, we explore how and what 
kind of institutional work is performed by executive remuneration consultants as individuals 
and as a collective in the process of creation of their professional project. In doing so, we aim 
to extend our knowledge of how the use of an institutional work lens may advance our 
understanding of new professional projects. Furthermore, research has pointed to the 
existence of ‘reciprocal dynamics between processes of institutionalization and processes of 
professionalization’ and called for further investigation of the ways in which the development 
of professional projects may lead to field-level reconfigurations (Suddaby and Viale 2011: 
424; Lefsrud and Suddaby 2012). Specifically, Muzio, Brock, and Suddaby (2013) highlight 
the need for further understanding of the ways in which professions and professionals shape 
the development of contemporary business practices. Drawing on Suddaby and Viale’s 
(2011) framework, we aim to further our understanding of how professionals shape other 
institutions in the field through exploring how professionalization efforts of ERC services 
relate to other actors and broader developments within/of the field of executive pay-setting 
practices. 
 
Our empirical focus on executive remuneration consultants in the UK provides a fruitful 
platform for the application of the institutional work perspective. First, the provision of ERC 
services is a small field delivered at board level, which means that the nature of the work is 
highly individualized, and individual consultants at senior levels may often possess 
significant power. This means that paying attention to micro-level dynamics of 
professionalization becomes crucial in order to understand the development of this 
professional service. Moreover, the consultants constituting the ERC field is very 
heterogeneous - they come from various professional backgrounds, often use multi-
disciplinary expertise and work in consultancies with a variety of specializations (e.g. 
accountancy, HR, legal)—indicating a necessity to account for these multiple voices in order 
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to understand the professional project of ERC. Finally, ERC is part of a broader field of 
executive remuneration which is populated which multiple stakeholders who may have 
competing interests, for example, state, clients, shareholders, employing organizations, 
regulators, and the public. Therefore, exploring ERC offers a good platform to explore the 
capacity of an institutional work approach to help situate the development of this professional 
project in relation to broader institutional transformations.  
 
Our analysis demonstrates that by exploring the forms of institutional work performed both 
by collective and individual actors, we are able to account for the multiplicity of voices 
within a professional community and reveal the tensions involved in the creation of a 
professional project. Our findings indicate that consultants strategically engage in what seems 
to be the work of creating a new professional project at the collective 
occupational/organizational level, whilst at the same time individual consultants actively 
resist and undermine this work. A closer analysis of these tensions between micro- and 
macro-level processes suggests that the development of ERC services is better understood 
when viewed as part of the institutional work of creating and maintaining the broader 
institution of executive pay practices. We argue that exploring the development of a 
professional project through the institutional work lens enables a more nuanced 
understanding of internal dynamics of ERC professionalization and provides a more complex 
illustration of the ways in which these developments relate to broader institutional 
arrangements. Our findings extend the empirical foundations of the concept of institutional 
work by improving our understanding of how individual and collective actors are involved in 
various forms of institutional creation (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) and highlighting the 
importance of exploring relationships between these levels of analysis. We also provide 
further support for Suddaby and Viale’s (2011) theorization of the role of professionals in the 
process of institutionalization by demonstrating how the process of ERC professionalization 
and reconfiguration of institutional practices of remuneration setting are closely linked. In 
doing so, our research strengthens the emerging body of empirical evidence arguing for the 
potential of (neo-) institutional approaches to offer a more productive analysis of 
contemporary professionalism (see Muzio,Brock, and Suddaby 2013). 
 
The article proceeds with a brief critique of current theories of the development of new 
professional projects, followed by a discussion of institutional work as a potentially fruitful 
approach to understanding these processes. We then outline the context of the development of 
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ERC services in the UK and our methodology before proceeding to an empirical analysis of 
the types of institutional work performed by ERC professionals. The final section relates our 
findings to the discussion of the possibilities offered by the institutional work concept for 
analysis of new professional projects, and outlines avenues for further research. 
 
PROFESSIONALS PROJECTS AND INSTITUTIONAL WORK 
 
Research exploring the development and professionalization of new knowledge-intensive 
organization based occupations and services indicates that these new professional projects 
tend to exhibit ‘weak professionalism’ (Fincham 2006) compared with ‘traditional’ liberal 
professions (Reed 1996), owing either to an inability or unwillingness to professionalize in 
the same way or to a choice of different strategies and tactics for professionalization (Reed 
1996; Fincham 2006; McKenna 2006; Morris et al. 2006; Muzio et al. 2011; Muzio, 
Kirkpatrick, and Kipping 2011). These studies have recently been criticized by Muzio, 
Kirkpatrick, and Kipping (2011) for being ahistorical and/or acontextual, that is, not taking 
into consideration how various actors, such as training institutions, state, clients, employing 
organizations, and professionals themselves, shape the development of new professional 
projects. They propose a multiactor model that accounts for the role of key actors—a model 
that offers more dynamic and complex insights into how and why some new professional 
projects are more successful or exhibit ‘stronger’ professionalization efforts than others. 
However, this model still seems to overlook a number of issues. 
 
First, similar to other approaches in the sociology of professions, the multi-actor model 
focuses on the macro-level of analysis and views professions as collective entities represented 
by their professional associations. Such a focus fails to pay attention to the multiplicity of 
voices that often exist within a newly emerging professional community that may cause 
internal tensions in the course of professionalization. Moreover, given that research on 
established professions indicates the importance of individual professionals’ agency in 
facilitating or resisting the development of/within their field (Thomas and Davies 2005; 
Reay, Golden-Biddle, and Germann 2006; Waring and Currie 2009; Suddaby 2010), such 
analysis could also benefit our understanding of newly emerging projects. In fact, it may be 
particularly significant because new professional projects that emerge within large 
organizations tend to demonstrate a corporate model of professionalism which, amongst other 
things, is characterized by associations being formed at the level of firm rather than 
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individual membership (see Kipping, Kirkpatrick, and Muzio 2006; Beaverstock, Hall, and 
Faulconbridge 2010; Muzio et al. 2011), which means that macrolevel analysis of 
professional development may not account for the voices of professionals on the ground. 
Therefore, in order to understand the complexity of the development of such new entities it is 
crucial to link the micro and macro levels processes—individual, organizational, and 
occupational. Recent studies drawing on neo-institutional theory (e.g. Reay, Golden-Biddle, 
and Germann 2006; Suddaby 2010; Daudigeos 2013; Empson, Cleaver, and Allen 2013; 
McCann et al. 2013) have begun to highlight the importance of micro-level analysis and the 
role of individual professionals in the process of institutional change, and we suggest that this 
line of inquiry will be helpful in addressing the above concerns. 
 
Finally, the underlying comparison with ‘liberal’ professions is still implicitly present in the 
literature, with professionalization of new knowledge-intensive occupations being viewed as 
a relatively systematic process with a fairly clear direction and a goal: to achieve monopoly 
(see Larson 1977: xvii). Muzio, Brock, and Suddaby (2013: 701) argue that such focus on 
monopoly obscures the broader role that professionals exercise in relation to transforming 
broader institutional arrangements and social environments. They suggest that an 
institutionalist approach to understanding professionalism has the possibility to rectify this 
problem (see also Leicht and Fennell 2008; Scott 2008; Suddaby and Viale 2011). In light of 
these critiques, we draw on Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006) conception of the different 
forms of institutional work in order to analyse the emergence of the new ERC service aiming 
to show whether and how the concept may offer a more fruitful analysis of this process. 
Institutional work is defined as ‘the purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed 
at creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions’ (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006: 215; 
Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2009; Lawrence, Leca, and Zilber 2013). This may also 
include more distributed ‘day-to-day instances of agency’ suggesting that less reflexive and 
more mundane actions also contribute to changing institutions (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 
2011: 53). Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006: 219) concept of institutional work views actors’ 
behaviour as strategic and intentional but situated, and their typology of various forms of 
institutional work is particularly useful for understanding how actors shape institutional 
processes. They suggest that actors may engage in three broad categories of institutional 
work: creation, maintenance and/or disruption, and that there are different types of work 
within each category (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006: 211). Several studies that have applied 
this framework to explore existing professions demonstrate how they perform the work of 
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maintenance and/or ‘repair’ when their position of dominance is under threat (Currie et al. 
2012; Micelotta and Washington 2013). In contrast, we focus on the developing professional 
project of ERC services and we are interested in investigating the ways in which the work of 
institutional creation takes place. According to Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006) typology 
creating institutions may involve such forms of institutional work as advocacy, defining, 
vesting, constructing identities, changing norms and constructing networks, mimicry, 
theorizing, and educating. Their typology is derived from an analysis of institutional work 
observed in a number of studies; whilst empirically driven the typology nevertheless is a 
useful starting point when looking at the forms of institutional work carried out in the 
creation of a professional project. In our analysis, we aim to identify the kind of institutional 
work executive remuneration consultants engage in the process of creation of their 
professional project. 
 
Moreover, as we have noted previously, the concept of institutional work allows for the 
analysis of both collective and individual agency, and recent studies have indicated that to 
achieve a more nuanced exploration of professionalization it is crucial to explore how 
individual-level institutional work relates to a more macro-level of institutional work, for 
example, work performed at ‘elite’ or organizational level (McCann et al. 2013; Empson et 
al. 2013). McCann et al. (2013), for instance, demonstrate that the professionalization project 
of paramedics promoted by the professional ‘elites’ is impeded by the institutional work 
performed by individuals on the ground. Building on these insights, we are particularly 
interested in further explicating the relationship between individual and collective dynamics 
of engagement in the different forms of institutional work involved in creation of ERC 
(Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) to produce a more complex analysis of the internal dynamics 
of this professional project. 
 
Finally, Suddaby and Viale (2011: 424) argue that the institutional work perspective may be 
fruitfully applied to understanding the role of professionals in organizational- and field-level 
change. They suggest that ‘professional projects carry with them projects of 
institutionalization’ and point out four ways in which professionals may transform 
institutional fields, for example, by challenging the incumbent order and defining new spaces; 
by populating fields with new actors; by introducing new rules and standards; and by 
challenging or conferring hierarchies in the field. Indeed, a number of existing studies have 
illustrated how the development of professional projects explicitly and implicitly result in 
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such transformations or/and maintenance of broader institutions as well as various 
institutional practices (Currie et al. 2012; Lefsrud and Suddaby 2012; Daudigeos 2013; 
Micelotta and Washington 2013). Zietsma and McKnight’s (2009) study indicates, however, 
that professionals may not be the only actor necessarily causing transformation of the field 
and shows how a variety of different factors and different actors may work together to 
instigate field-level change. Our empirical analysis seeks to draw on and extend these 
insights. Building on Suddaby and Viale (2011), we aim to situate the analysis of internal 
complexities of the development of the ERC project in the wider institutional field in order to 
offer a more contextual understanding of its role in shaping broader business practices of 
executive remuneration. Hence, empirical sections of this article will explore how consultants 
perform institutional work to further their professional project as well as what broader 
institutional arrangements they are creating and/or transforming through this work.3 
However, before proceeding to our data analysis, we outline the background for the 
development of ERC services. 
 
EXECUTIVE PAY-SETTING PRACTICES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ERC 
SERVICES IN THE UK 
 
A complex set of circumstances and actors are involved in the emergence of ERC services in 
the UK. The rise of ERC is closely associated with the growth of visibility and regulation of 
the broader executive pay setting practices. For instance, the growing prominence of ERC is 
closely linked to the rise of the role of remuneration committees in the UK corporate 
governance landscape. Concerns about the growth and size of directors’ pay and its weak link 
to company’s performance led to calls for independent scrutiny of executive pay. Pressures 
from the state and other stakeholders brought about changes in the practice of setting 
executive pay. First, it has ceased to be a function of in-house human resource departments 
(Conyon, Peck, and Sadler 2009; Bender 2011). Instead, the Greenbury Report (1995), 
commissioned in light of excessive pay in the then newly deregulated utilities industry, 
recommended that remuneration committees should be setting executive pay to ensure it is 
set independently of management and in the interests of shareholders (Bender 2012). The 
Greenbury Report encouraged remuneration committees to seek independent advice, 
stipulating that they should be able to consult external advisors: 
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The [remuneration] committee may need to draw on outside advice. The company’s 
management will normally hire outside consultants, if any, but the committee should 
also be consulted about such appointments and should be free to retain its own 
consultants in case of need (1995: 25). 
 
Executive remuneration consultants typically provide remuneration committees with market 
data on pay comparisons, advise on the design and implementation of remuneration plans, 
and generally help them to make informed decisions (Bender 2011). With the publication of 
the UK Combined Code in 2000 the use of remuneration consultants by remuneration 
committees became part of best practice of corporate governance, suggesting the beginning 
of the process of institutionalization of ERC use. More recent editions of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code add other provisions which further aid this process, such as recommending 
that the board should ‘ensure that non-executive directors have access to independent 
professional advice at the company’s expense’ (Financial Reporting Council 2012: 16). 
 
Despite empowering remuneration committees to be more proactive, executive pay continued 
to spiral upwards, even during times of poor performance. In a bid to stop this, the 
government introduced the Director’s Remuneration Report Regulations (DRRR) (HMSO 
2002) as part of Company Law, which made it mandatory for firms to disclose remuneration 
related information in the annual report. One of the items that firms were required to disclose 
as part of the Director’s Remuneration Report was the identity of their remuneration 
consultants, and the advice they sought from them. This increased the profile of remuneration 
consultants and their use by remuneration committees in the UK. Evidence from the DRRR 
disclosures showed that the use of remuneration consultants is a common practice across 
large firms and has spread to smaller firms (Kay and Putten 2007; Conyon, Peck, and Sadler 
2009). Evidence that this is a common practice can be seen from the fact that 95% of FTSE 
100 and 84% of FTSE 350 reported using ERC services in 2013–2014 financial year.4 These 
figures suggest increasing institutionalization of the use of ERC services. Thus, the growing 
body of corporate governance regulation and policy partly helped generate a relatively 
distinct niche, facilitating a stronger presence for these services in the landscape of executive 
pay-setting practices. Most large Professional Service Firms (PSFs) have seized this 
opportunity to grow their services in this direction and many have established a designated 
department dealing with executive remuneration (Bender 2011, 2012). There is also a 
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growing number of smaller boutique consultancies which specialize only in giving 
remuneration advice to remuneration committees.  
 
Up to this point, remuneration consultants, although acknowledged as actors in the pay-
setting process, fell under little scrutiny. However, as a result of the financial crisis in 2008 
there was greater focus on the competence and performance of top management and 
questions of whether their performance justified the pay increases they received. The issue of 
executive pay became ever more topical and remuneration consultants were widely criticized 
in press, media and in the academic literature for driving up top executive salaries (Conyon, 
Peck, and Sadler 2009; Treanor 2009; Hosking 2010; Murphy and Sandino 2010; Bender 
2011, 2012). In 2009 The Walker Report (2009) was commissioned to study corporate 
governance in the financial sector. One recommendation of the draft Walker Review (2009) 
was to regulate the use of remuneration consultants. This was not well received by the PSFs 
involved with remuneration consultancy, and in response, a group of leading consultants 
established the Remuneration Consultancy Group (RCG) in 2009. The Group was set up to 
develop and make visible professional standards under which consultants should operate. 
This led to a softer stance on the regulation of ERC in the final Walker Review report which 
endorsed this move to professionalization:  
 
Remuneration consultants should have a formal constitution for the professional 
group that has now been formed, with provision for independent oversight and review 
of the remuneration consultancy code (Walker 2009: 126). 
 
In 2011 the RCG developed and pledged to maintain a Code of Conduct which is revised 
biannually (RCG 2013). The Code stipulates that RCG members: 
 
‘Like other business professionals. . .comply with the fundamental principles of 
transparency, integrity, objectivity, competence, due care and confidentiality’ when 
providing remuneration advice (RCG 2013: 3) 
 
The Code outlines this set of ethical principles, as well as the exact role and remit of 
remuneration consultants and ways to address potential conflicts of interest. The Code also 
outlines sanctions, specifying that the member-company’s membership may be terminated 
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in case of systematic breach of ethical principles if reported by a client. The role of the RCG 
is to conduct an annual review of the Code’s effectiveness, revise the code and promote it ‘to 
stakeholders in remuneration decision making’ (RCG 2013)’. The RCG has organizational 
(but not individual) membership and in 2013 the RCG had as its members most of the major 
firms consulting in this area, including 93% of those advising FTSE 100 (Interviewee 4). 
According to the Biannual Review of the Code of Conduct (RCG 2014) in 2014 more than 
half of its member firms take the Code into account as part of their internal quality assurance 
process and offer formal annual training related to the Code, which seems to indicate 
substantive support for the Code and the RCG activity. 
 
The formation of the RCG and the Code suggests that consultants seek to foster the 
confidence of remuneration committees, shareholders, and other stakeholders in the integrity 
of their working practices. These steps taken by the ERC industry seem to indicate a 
professionalization agenda similar to those of other new organizational occupations (see 
Beaverstock, Hall, and Faulconbridge 2010; Muzio, Kirkpatrick, and Kipping 2011). 
However, as we explain in the following sections, the institutional work lens enables these 
developments to be put under closer scrutiny and to be situated in the broader context of the 
development of the institution of xecutive pay-setting practices. 
 
SAMPLE AND METHOD 
 
This project draws on 19 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with senior executive 
remuneration consultants in large, medium-sized, and boutique consultancies in the UK. 
Senior consultants were our target group as we judged them to have first-hand knowledge of 
the development of the service and, indeed, all interviewees had extensive work experience in 
the field and many had witnessed its emergence in the UK first-hand. Moreover, owing to 
their position many senior consultants had significant power through the access to decision 
making and resources (see Empson, Cleaver, and Allen 2013) so the sample lent itself well to 
the micro-level analysis of institutional work that is of particular interest in this article. 
 
There is no official register of individual executive remuneration consultants, so initial 
contact as made through the RCG. Consistent with other studies investigating ‘elite’ 
populations (Moyser and Wagstaffe 1987), we then successfully used snowball sampling. We 
interviewed 19 senior consultants in total—a sample that represented a significant proportion 
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of the senior stratum of this new professional service as, according to our interviewees’ 
estimates and our research of the industry, the sampling frame is very small—around 50 
senior consultants in the UK. Given the small size of the field, for reasons of anonymity we 
must be very circumspect in specifying the exact positions of participants and consultancy 
names because even in the large firms which dominate the market (Conyon, Peck, and Sadler 
2009), practices dealing with executive remuneration are small, making participants easily 
identifiable. We can however, point out the following characteristics of the sample. All 19 
participants were senior-level consultants with extensive experience of working with boards 
and remuneration committees and there was also a good distribution of interviewees across 
firm specializations (see Table 1). 
 
 Table 1. Number of interviewees by seniority and firm specialisation 
 Number of firms and firm specialisation 
Partner level Accounting 
firms  
Law 
firms  
HR  
firms 
 
Specialist 
ERC  
firms 
Partner 3 2 4 1 
Senior partner 3 1 2  
Managing partner 1   2 
  
 
The professional backgrounds of our interviewees varied: four were accountants, four 
lawyers, three trained actuaries, and two engineers; three had HR qualifications and three had 
no professional background but held MBA degrees. Interestingly, the background of 
participants did not necessarily correspond to the firm’s specialization, pointing to the 
diversity of expertise within the firm’s ERC practices (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Interviewee background distribution across firms 
                          Firm sector/specialisation 
Interviewee 
background 
Law Accounting HR Specialist 
ERC 
Accounting   2 1 1 
Actuary  2  1 
Engineering  1 1  
Law  3   1 
HR  1 2  
Other (e.g. MBA)  1 2  
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This diversity is representative of the field, since the complexity of rules and practices for 
setting executive pay packages requires a variety and often a mixture of professional 
expertise. Interviews lasted between 1 and 2 hours. Interview questions centred on issues 
related to participants’ career pathways into ERC, the history of the field, its current 
development and professionalization, and the day-to-day work processes of consultants. 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed and then analysed by two authors. The data were 
also triangulated with supplementary sources such as the RCG documentation (consultation 
paper, Code of Conduct, review of the Code, RCG governance framework), and firms’ 
documentation related to executive remuneration advice (e.g. ERC-related press releases, 
participant firms’ codes of conduct statements).  
 
Our approach to data is interpretative, meaning that we give priority to the views, opinions, 
and interpretations of our participants in line with our aim to focus on individual-level 
experiences and views which is consistent with trying to understand the micro-scale 
institutional work. We apply Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006) conceptualization of the forms 
of institutional work involved in the creation, maintenance, and disruption of (new) 
institutional arrangements. Because we were exploring a developing professional project we 
were concerned with identifying the different types of efforts aimed at institutionalizing ERC 
as a potential profession (Larson 1977; Clarke 2000; Groß and Kieser 2006; Hodgson 2008; 
Beaverstock, Hall, and Faulconbridge 2010; Muzio, Kirkpatrick, and Kipping 2011). 
Therefore, when going through our data initially, we focused on identifying the different 
types of institutional work of creation suggested by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006:221). They 
offer an elaborate outline of the different types of institutional work associated with creation 
of institutions for example, advocacy, defining, vesting, constructing identities, changing 
norms and constructing networks, mimicry, theorizing, and educating. Similar to other 
research (see Empson,Cleaver, and Allen 2013), we have not been able to identify all the 
types of institutional work outlined by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006)—an issue we discuss 
further in the article, but three forms of creation work emerged from the interview data: 
creating identities, defining, and constructing normative networks. Following our interest in 
exploring the tensions in the process of emergence of the professional project, we traced both 
micro-level dynamics as well as broader, collective-level action for each type of institutional 
work. In analysing our interview data through Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006) typology of 
institutional work, incongruity emerged between individual- and collective-level dynamics of 
the work of creation of the new professional project, with the former largely undermining the 
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latter. In order to make sense of these tensions, the second stage of analysis involved situating 
these developments within the broader context using Suddaby and Viale’s (2011) typology in 
order to see how professionalization efforts contribute to the reconfiguration of the broader 
institution of executive pay-setting practices. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL WORK OF EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION CONSULTANTS 
 
The following sections are structured around the discussion of the three forms of institutional 
work of creation that emerged from our data: creating identities, defining, and establishing 
normative networks. We expose the tensions between individual- and collective-level 
professionalization efforts and also situate each type of the institutional work of creation in 
the broader context of executive remuneration field developments. We aim to show that such 
contextualizing indicates that the institutional work done by consultants may be better 
understood not as work aimed chiefly at institutionalizing ERC as a potential professional 
project, but as institutional work that takes place as part of the creation and maintenance of 
the broader institution of executive pay-setting practices. 
 
The work of institutional creation: creating identities 
 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006: 221) define the institutional work of creation of identities as 
‘defining the relationship between an actor and the field in which that actor operates’, 
suggesting that this process is central for the creation of any institution. Indeed, 
professionalization is conditioned by the emergence of a relatively well-defined occupational 
group, a like-minded community, performing the same tasks, and sharing an identity (Abbott 
1991; Dent and Whitehead 2002; Pratt, Rockman, and Kaufman 2006). Wilensky (1964) 
suggests that naming a new shared identity is an important step in the creation of any new 
profession. Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006: 224) classification underscores the importance of 
collective action in the creation of identity, but our data suggest that there was a complex 
relationship between the individual- and collective-level work of identity creation. Identity 
creation work at the level of the individual was rather fragmented and contested which 
seemed to be related to the fact that ERC is a heterogeneous service which requires a variety 
of expertise: 
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It’s necessary for [ERC] consultants to have a broad understanding across the fields; 
you know, corporate finance, tax, strategy, law, actuarial and benefits issues and HR 
(Interviewee 6). 
 
I think a professional service firm should respond to what clients want. . .so our 
remuneration advice has moved from purely tax-based type advice, employing 
lawyers and accountants, to incorporating other knowledge (Interviewee 5). 
 
The above quotes suggest that in the delivery of the new service some hybridization of 
professional expertise was taking place partly driven by the need to offer the best service for 
the client. Yet, the fact that remuneration consultants had a variety of professional 
backgrounds presented a challenge when constructing a new shared identity at the level of the 
individual (see also Clarke, 2000; McKenna 2006; Vough 2012). Consultants with 
backgrounds in ‘traditional’ professions were reluctant to ‘give up’ their initial professional 
identification in favour of a new one: 
 
I would call myself an accountant . . . Partly it’s . . . gosh, you know, I went through 
three years of very difficult training and hard exams to become an accountant and you 
don’t give that up. I mean, I’m still an accountant, I still pay my dues. . . I suppose it’s 
a bit of my identity (Interviewee 11). 
 
Similarly to the interviewee above, many of those with backgrounds in established 
professions were not ready to embrace and actively champion their new identity. As the quote 
indicates, this reluctance was partly due to their strong commitment to their original 
profession and partially due to a ‘tainted’ image of the new identity since, as we outlined 
previously, consultants were seen as culpable for the soaring executive remuneration. 
However, those with non-professional backgrounds and backgrounds in less-established 
professions, such as HR, were more eager to associate themselves with the new identity: 
 
Yeah, I would [call myself an executive remuneration consultant]. I do think it’s . . . a 
junior profession and it’s new, and I’m sure that accountants and lawyers look down 
their noses at us a bit, but in the time I’ve been doing it, it’s become much more 
widely known...(Interviewee 10, MBA). 
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This interviewee was more optimistic about fostering a new identity and used the pronoun 
‘us’, suggesting identification. Several others also suggested that ‘there is a “new generation” 
of remuneration consultants who, regardless of their background, will be socialized on site 
and will be able to form the new identity of the executive remuneration consultant’ 
(Interviewee 8). Suddaby and Viale (2011: 248) point out that it is likely that actors may 
simultaneously occupy positions in multiple fields. Our data offer a clear illustration of this 
and also points to the fact that this duality of individual’s position clearly caused tension 
around identity creation which partially impeded the development of the ERC professional 
project. This finding compliments other research which suggests that it is common for new 
branches of consulting to draw on different expertise and that the latter may represent a 
challenge for potential professionalization in terms of ring fencing it (see e.g. McKenna 
2006). 
 
However, despite the internal micro-level tensions, consultants seemed more united in 
articulating their collective-level identity, particularly in relation to other stakeholders in the 
field of executive remuneration (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). Our interviewees agreed that 
ERC was distinct from other types of service: 
 
When I started working in this field, executive pay was part of the broad based pay. I 
think, going forward, we become more and more separate. . .different knowledge 
bases certainly, and the nature of your client is different (Interviewee 14). 
 
When regulations came into force . . . the industry transformed overnight and . . . 
companies. . . and we gained clarity who our clients were. So that was really how we 
got created . . .Now you have independent specialists in the area, and large firms have 
specialist units in the area. . (Interviewee 9). 
 
As the quotations indicate, by separating from other services within large firms and working 
with different clients ERC was seen to have developed its own visible identity vis-a`-vis 
external stakeholders such as client companies and other professional services. Crucially, as 
we have pointed out in previous sections, this process was largely conditioned by the state 
recognition of ERC as a distinct actor involved in the setting of executive pay; this 
recognition was in the form of various state regulation which outlined their role (e.g. HMSO 
2002; Walker 2009; Financial Reporting Council 2012). In fact, use of the phrase ‘being 
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created’ in the above quote indicates that the initial work of the collective identity creation 
was to a large extent facilitated by the state and Walker Review (2009) encouraged further 
professionalization activity of ERC. Therefore, the role of the state in the process of ERC’s 
formation was significant, and it may be argued that the consultants themselves did not have 
to do such types of institutional work as advocacy or vesting. This suggests that different 
forms of institutional work of creation outlined by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) may be 
observed on different occasions depending on the context; moreover, not all forms of the 
institutional work of creation may be necessarily performed by one particular set of actors. 
 
Interestingly, if we look at the broader picture, such proactive state intervention was not 
aimed at creating a new branch of consultancy per se. Rather the state aimed to improve the 
functioning of the larger institution—a set of business practices related to setting executive 
pay. Given the internal tensions of identity creation and reluctance of further 
professionalization (discussed below), the ERC’s collective work of reaffirming their identity 
may be therefore better understood as part of the work of creation and maintenance of the 
institution of executive pay setting practices. Here, Suddaby and Viale’s (2011) theorization 
of the role of professionals in the broader field change is helpful when interpreting our data. 
They argue that professionals are significant agents and that they may shape broader 
institutional arrangements in several ways, for instance, through ‘defining new uncontested 
spaces’ for economic enterprise as well as ‘by defining new practice areas’ and populating 
the field with new actors. Both of these dynamics were visible in our case. For instance, all 
consultants regardless of their identification, professional background, or corporate 
association were adamant in articulating the importance of ERC for the wider practice of 
setting executive remuneration: 
 
I see my job as making sure remuneration committees make as informed a choice as it 
can. It’s our job to. . .be proactive in keeping our clients abreast of new developments 
. . . to test the client’s [knowledge]. . .(Interviewee 3). 
 
I think executive pay would be higher today if there was no advising. I think we are a 
break [on pay increases] . . . rather than an accelerator. If [remuneration committees] 
would stop taking advice . . . I think they would go with their first instinct [of what 
pay should be] which is quite often higher (Interviewee 1). 
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Similar to the above quotations, most interviewees highlighted the distinctive role of 
remuneration consultants in relation to other stakeholders in the field, reaffirming the 
importance of this new type of service and the crucial task of the new actors—(ERC 
consultants)—in improving the existing practices of executive pay. So whilst there were 
individual-level tensions in terms of creating a new identity with the view to potential 
professionalization, there was nonetheless an effort to craft a more visible collective ERC 
identity in the broader field of ERC—the work that contributed to the ongoing creation of the 
institution of executive pay and how it is set. As shown earlier, although consultants come 
from established disciplines they were able to re-orient existing skills and push jurisdictional 
boundaries to develop this new business practice area of executive remuneration and populate 
it with new agents. As we have explained earlier, most large PSFs now have specialized ERC 
units or departments; there has also been a rise in the number of independent boutique 
consultancies advising remuneration committees. It has to be noted though, that whilst 
Suddaby and Viale (2011) put much emphasis on the role of professionals in creating new 
spaces and actors, our data point to the significance of other actors and the relationship 
between the actors in this process. For instance, in our case the role of the state in locating the 
remit of new consulting services was critical as well as the role of the client in encouraging 
the development of novel expertise. Therefore, rather than being the only or primary agent to 
initiate these field changes ERC consultants seemed to cooperate with the state and other 
actors in their aim of reconfiguring the field of executive pay arrangements. 
 
The work of defining 
 
The next dynamic of institutional creation that emerged from our data was what Lawrence 
and Suddaby’s (2006: 221) describe as defining: ‘the construction of rule systems that confer 
status or identity, define boundaries of membership or create status hierarchies within a 
field’. In the context of ERC services, defining may be exemplified by the collective-level 
action of creating the RCG. The RCG currently allows only corporate membership and has a 
diverse range of member firms: 
 
It’s a very new area of expertise . . .a very open area and if you look across the market 
you would see consultants offering substantially different things . . . with different 
strengths... tax, legal, accounting . . . so it’s not a homogenous group (Interviewee 
15). 
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Despite the diversity of member firms in terms of specialization and size, the membership 
does create certain hierarchies when it comes to who may practise executive remuneration. 
For example, in order to join the RCG, a consultancy must have a client, yet the Walker 
Review (2009) advises companies seeking remuneration consultants to employ only those 
who adhere to the Code of Conduct (RCG 2013), that is, who are RCG members. As this 
interviewee highlighted: 
 
You have to have the client before you can join. And there are some clients who 
might not appoint you unless you’re a member. . .So maybe we’ve just lifted the 
drawbridge and we’ve made it more difficult for other organisations (Interviewee 4). 
 
However, because the Walker Review (2009) formulated recommendations only, it may not 
be difficult to find one’s first client from among the smaller FTSE350 companies. Hence, 
although membership defined certain boundaries, as it stands it has a rather limited potential 
for creating a ‘closure’ of the market that exists in traditional professions (see Muzio, 
Kirkpatrick, and Kipping 2011). Individual consultants were also sceptical of the RCG’s 
capacity to police the rules and membership: 
 
Clients could complain . . . that a member was in breach of the Code and [there are] 
protocols to expel a member . . . but I can’t actually envisage that it would ever 
happen, because at the end of the day, if Vodafone isn’t impressed with its advisors, 
it’s not going to complain, it’s just going to find advisors that can work with them. . 
.(Interviewee 1). 
 
Similar to this interviewee, most consultants were confident that rather than institutionalizing 
professional norms such as excluding a member from the group, the market mechanisms 
already discipline member firms to meet particular standards though clients’ power to hire 
and fire. So although new rules and hierarchies of professionalism appeared to be instituted in 
the ERC field through the collective professionalization actions, this process was undermined 
by consultants’ persistent belief in the superiority of other modes of work organization and 
quality regulation. At the individual level, there was reluctance for any further 
professionalization and most of our interviewees said that they ‘don’t see the RCG as 
20 
 
regulatory in any other way’ (Interviewee 12) besides specifying the role and remit of ERC 
and updating the Code. 
 
And yet, despite the individual scepticism about the possibility of the RCG to strengthen the 
professional project of ERC, the RCG’s activities and development continue to be supported 
by consultants at the level of collective action, for example, The RCG Board actively revise 
the Code and assess its effectiveness, the majority of ERC firms are currently members of the 
RCG and most member firms teach the Code to their staff (RCG 2014). This apparent 
incongruity can be explained when the work of defining is seen in the context of the broader 
field. The formation of the RCG creates certain hierarchies in the field of executive pay-
setting by giving member participants a certain status—that of legitimate members of the 
community of advisors on executive pay. The RCG and the Code do so by clarifying to the 
outside world the ways and standards by which they operate and create a visible (although 
not necessarily fully functioning) structure of self-regulation. This process may be interpreted 
through Suddaby and Viale’s (2011: 431) framework which suggests that professionals are 
instrumental in changing institutional arrangements through ‘creating new actors by 
legitimating new occupational categories’. In our case, we find that even though the 
professionalization process was contested it still serves to enhance the legitimacy of these 
new actors in the field. The creation and maintenance of the RCG reaffirms the position of 
remuneration consultants in the broader landscape of executive pay practices by ‘pointing’ 
the client companies to a pool of more ‘legitimate’ consultants in the field. In doing so, it 
reproduces and strengthens the current institutional arrangements of executive pay setting. 
However, whilst Suddaby and Viale (2011) point to the primary role of professionals in this 
process, our data suggest again that, similar to the previous section, the creation of new actors 
is reinforced by other actors in the field, particularly the state, for example, the Walker 
Review (2009) helps endorse the position of these new actors. Furthermore, consultants’ 
belief in the importance of market forces, points to the significance of other systems of 
regulatory logics (Lounsbury 2002, 2007) and rules in shaping the extent of field-change 
caused by professional projects. 
 
Constructing normative networks 
 
Finally, another type of institutional work related to the creation of a new professional project 
is the construction of normative networks, that is, the construction of ‘inter-organizational 
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connections through which practices become normatively sanctioned and which form the 
relevant peer group with respect to compliance, monitoring, and evaluation’ (Lawrence and 
Suddaby 2006: 221). An example of such work is the creation of the RCG and the efforts of 
this network aimed at developing and maintaining the Code. As we have outlined, in 2009 the 
founding member firms came together to produce the Code—a set of rule which. . . 
 
clearly sets out the role of executive remuneration consultants and the professional 
standards by which they advise their clients (RCG 2013: 1). 
 
As mentioned previously, the network of member firms revises and maintains the Code, 
moreover, member firms seem to make an effort to promote it and observe it. Traditionally, a 
code of conduct is a way in which professions demonstrate that their members are competent 
and that ‘the profession intends to maintain and enforce high standards’ in the public interest 
(Higgs-Kleyn and Kapelianis 1999: 364). The Code may therefore be seen as an attempt to 
promote and institutionalize the logic and principles of professionalism as an organizing 
mechanism for work (see also Wilensky 1964; Lounsbury, 2002, 2007). Given that the 
quality of advice and information asymmetry are the main concerns in the development of 
new professional services (Kipping 2011) and in light of continuously negative media 
portrayal of ERC (Treanor 2009; Hosking 2010), it might be expected that consultants would 
support the institutionalization of professionalism, especially given the collective efforts 
already invested in professionalization. However, individual consultants seemed to contest 
the introduction of this new system of rules by which they were expected to operate: 
 
We are not misleading a grandma, we are advising sophisticated buyers. At the end of 
the day, the only people that we care about are the shareholders, and if the 
shareholders are happy with the approach, then we’re happy. Because it’s the 
shareholders who own these companies; it’s not the media, the public, it’s not the 
government, it’s the shareholders . . . and no one else should have that say 
(Interviewee 7). 
 
The quote indicates that consultants did not consider that the public interest was something 
that they need to be concerned about which suggests little institutionalization of the new 
logics of work associated with professionalism (see Lounsbury 2002). Similarly, clients were 
not seen to be in need of protection and most interviewees were positive that they provide 
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sufficient quality of advice. The new Code was also resisted by individual consultants 
because they were adamant that they did not need another set of quality controls: 
 
I mean, it [the new Code of Conduct] hasn’t changed particularly what we do . . . We 
all as individual firms, of course, have our own professional standards and we enforce 
those professional standards. . .Moreover, most individuals are accountants, lawyers 
and so on; they have their own professional standards (Interviewee 18). 
 
As this quotation indicates, there are already several ‘layers’ of conduct control: those with 
professional backgrounds were already expected to comply with their own professional codes 
of ethics, moreover, PSFs also typically have their own codes which regulate the ethics of 
service delivery and business practice (e.g. Towers Watson & Co. 2011). Furthermore, other 
market-based quality controls like losing reputation or the possibility of being fired were seen 
as very significant. As Lawrence and Suddaby (2006: 225) suggest, the construction of new 
networks often happen alongside and affect other pre-existing institutional activities and 
structures. In our case, it appears that the competing pressures of these ‘layers’ of quality 
assurance can be seen as one of the reasons why individual consultants resisted the Code and 
professional principles as it was yet another set of regulatory practices. This individual-level 
apprehension may be seen as undermining the broader collective professionalization project. 
Given the micro-level resistance of the collective institutional work of creating normative 
networks and rules, these efforts, again, are better understood as part of a broader endeavour 
to create and maintain the institutional arrangement of executive pay practices. As pointed 
out earlier, the state has already created a certain space for consultants to exist through 
various forms of executive pay regulation (Greenbury 1995; HMSO 2002; Walker 2009; 
Financial Reporting Council 2012). It may be argued that even though there was less 
intention to professionalize, consultants persevered with the collective institutional work of 
creating normative networks because it served to strengthen and maintain their position as a 
legitimate actor in the field of ERC. This strategic intention was clear from the interviews, as 
most of our participants were very reflexive and pragmatic about the role of the RCG: 
 
I think . . . it’s almost an insurance policy; so if next year executive remuneration 
becomes a big political issue again, you know. . .if it really hits the headlines, if the 
politicians decide that they’re going to do something, the fact that we’ve got the 
Remuneration Consultants Group and we’ve got a very credible chairman and we’ve 
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got a Code and, you know, all that stuff, I see it as an insurance policy (Interviewee 
10). 
 
Consultants saw the Code’s role as satisfying the requirements of the state to address 
concerns about executive pay, and the RCG as ‘part of the work to support Sir David 
Walker on the review of banking . . . and executive pay problem’ (Interviewee 4). 
 
Hence, such actions may be seen as supporting institutionalization of the current arrangement 
of executive pay practices. Here again, our data relate in an interesting way to Suddaby and 
Viale’s (2011) suggestion that professionalization projects create boundaries and institute 
new systems of rules in the field, particularly through introducing the logic of 
professionalism to the field. They suggest that professionalization and institutionalization are 
two reciprocal dynamics. We find some supporting evidence of this, but our data also indicate 
a greater complexity of the extent to which the professionalization project of ERC brings with 
it the institutionalization of the new logic of professionalism in the field of pay-setting 
practice. As we have shown above and in the previous section, consultants questioned the 
role of the Code and the RCG as a genuine vehicle of self-regulation as well as doubted that 
professionalism was a suitable regulatory principle in this field. This indicates the importance 
of considering the role and power of other actors and logics that operate in the field for 
example, market logic, organizational logic (see Lounsbury 2002, 2007) in order to determine 
how and whether professionals are able to initiate and/or institute new sets of rules and to 
what extent they are able to do so. Moreover, our data suggest that that even weak and 
contested professionalization processes (what may be referred to as ‘image professionalism’ 
(Kipping 2011)) may still reverberate through the field and aid its reconfiguration. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this article was to explore the insights provided by applying an institutional work 
approach to investigate the emergence and development of the new professional project of 
ERC (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2009, 2011; Lawrence, 
Leca, and Zilber 2013). Specifically, using Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006) model, we 
explored how executive remuneration consultants engaged in the different forms of work of 
institutional creation at the individual and collective levels; then, following Suddaby and 
Viale (2011), we situated this work within broader changes in the field. From the point of 
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view of traditional sociology of professions approach, ERC’s professional project appears to 
demonstrate organizational or corporate professionalism (Muzio, Kirkpatrick, and Kipping 
2011) similar to executive search, management consulting, and project management (Groß 
and Kieser 2006; McKenna 2006; Morris et al. 2006; Hodgson 2008; Beaverstock, Hall, and 
Faulconbridge 2010; Kipping 2011). From this perspective the professional project of ERC is 
simply ‘weak’ (Fincham 2006) or, at best, exhibits ‘image professionalism’ (Kipping 2011). 
We argued that an institutionalist perspective offers a more productive analysis of the ERC 
professional project, both in terms of providing a better understanding of the internal 
dynamics of its development and in terms of highlighting its role in transforming the broader 
institutional arrangements of executive pay. 
 
The institutional work approach allows for a micro-level analysis of the agency of individual 
professionals. Drawing on Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006) classification of the forms of 
institutional work, we highlighted the multiplicity of voices within the professional 
community exposing the contested nature of the process of professionalization of ERC. Our 
data showed that the individuals within the community of ERC professionals may 
intentionally and/or unintentionally, undermine the broader scale collective efforts aimed at 
the creation of the ERC professional project, for example, by being reluctant to embrace the 
new identity or professional self-regulation. Given that these are senior professionals with the 
potential power and resources to facilitate or resist change (Empson, Cleaver, and Allen 
2013), this may account for the overall ‘weak’ progress of professionalization (see Muzio, 
Kirkpatrick and Kipping 2011). Thus, micro-level analysis of institutional work allows us to 
highlight the voice and agency of individual professionals which are obscured in the 
traditional sociology of professions frameworks with their focus on a collective (e.g. 
occupational or organizational) level of analysis. Our findings also indicate that it is crucial to 
explore micro-level dynamics alongside or in relation to the collective level of analysis. 
Previously, McCann et al. (2013) have illustrated how the paramedics’ professional project 
was contested because professionals’ behaviour at the ‘ground’ level contradicted 
professionalization efforts of the professional ‘elite’. This chimes with the findings of this 
article, although in our case, the same group of senior professionals exhibited contradictory 
strategies of creating and undermining the new project simultaneously: whilst strategically 
implementing various features of professionalism (e.g. professional association and 
regulation) at a collective level, remuneration consultants were resisting elements of 
professionalization as individuals (e.g. in relation to embracing the new identity or embracing 
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professionalism as a principle of their work organization). Hence, we suggest that, rather than 
comparing the progress of new professional projects to that of traditional professions, the 
analysis of the relations between the levels of institutional work may help better explain the 
development mechanisms and trajectories of such projects as ERC. 
 
Furthermore, our study lends weight to McCann et al.’s (2013) suggestion that internal 
tensions may result in contradictory outcomes for the profession as a whole. We take this 
argument a step further; drawing on Suddaby and Viale’s (2011) framework, we showed that 
exploring the tensions between individual and collective level in relation to the broader field 
processes allowed us to see that the creation of the ERC professional project may not have 
been a goal in itself; rather, the institutional work efforts of ERC professionals are more 
productively conceptualized as part of the process of creation and maintenance of the current 
institutional arrangements of executive pay-setting practices. This alternative analysis makes 
it possible to move the exploration of the development of this professional service beyond an 
assessment of its success or failure in terms of securing closure or monopoly (Larson 1977). 
When viewed as part of the creation of a broader institution of executive pay practices, 
ERC’s collective (quasi-)professionalization efforts may actually be considered as very 
successful. Such analysis accounts for current developments of ERC but does not eliminate 
the possibility of a more traditional professional project emerging at a later stage, should 
conditions be conducive. 
 
Our analysis extends Suddaby and Viale’s (2011) conception of the role of professionals in 
shaping field-level change as well as various business practices. We showed that ERC 
professionals, indeed, open new uncontested spaces by pushing the boundaries of existing 
expertise and jurisdictions, they foreground new institutional rules of the ERC practice; as 
well as populate the new ‘space’ with new actors—for example, new departments within 
large consultancies or small boutique consultancies that work only with remuneration 
committees. However, whilst Suddaby and Viale (2011) pay much attention to the role of 
professionals in transforming the field, such accounts are criticized for their neglect of power 
relations that may shape these practices (Clegg 2010). Our findings lend weight to this 
argument; we have shown that in the case of ERC the state played a crucial role in defining 
the remit of ERC as well as in triggering their professionalization efforts. In our case, the 
state, clients, consultants, and other actors seemed to all contribute together to the 
institutionalization of particular executive pay-setting practices. The role of consultants is 
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then better viewed as cooperating or ‘coalescing’ (Zietsma and McKnight 2009) with other 
actors in the field when creating the new practice of executive pay setting. Moreover, 
although we showed that even a weak professional project may lead to field-level changes, 
our data also indicate that the process of the reconfiguration of the broader field may be very 
gradual: for instance, the institutionalization of the logic of professionalism was only partial 
and consultants continued actively reproducing the logic of the market and organizational 
logic which are historically dominant within these business practices (see Lounsbury 2002, 
2007). Overall, our findings suggest that in order to produce an analysis that is more sensitive 
to the ‘social fabric’ in which professionals are embedded (Clegg 2010: 5) and avoid 
reproducing the notion of professionals as ‘hypermuscular agents’ (Suddaby 2010) when 
exploring their role in field-level transformation it is crucial to consider the role of and the 
relationship between (e.g. conflict or cooperation) other actors in the field. Moreover, it is 
crucial not to overlook the role of other established institutional practices and structures 
which may constrain or enable the role of professionals in shaping institutional fields. 
 
Finally, our exploration of institutional work in the setting of a newly developing professional 
service also yields some interesting insights and questions about the application of Lawrence 
and Suddaby’s typology (2006). First, Empson, Cleaver, and Allen (2013) point out that the 
typology is based largely on an analysis of studies that mainly examine the macro level of 
creation, maintenance, and disruption of institutions. Our analysis suggests that some 
strategies of institutional work of creation, indeed, lend themselves better to macro level 
analysis, for example, vesting or advocacy; whilst others, for example, creating identities or 
creating networks, are more versatile. Moreover, similar to other studies (Currie et al. 2012; 
Daudigeos 2013; Empson, Cleaver, and Allen 2013; McCann et al. 2013), our analysis shows 
that, although it is empirically driven by the synthesis of existing studies, Larence and 
Suddaby’s (2006) typology is a useful starting point in analysing the different forms of 
institutional work. Yet, we also found that not all forms of the institutional work of creation 
were identifiable in our case which suggests that institutional work is context specific, that is, 
different forms of institutional work may emerge in different circumstances. Hence, a 
question for further investigation is whether certain forms of institutional work may be more 
prevalent or more essential than others for the creation (maintenance or disruption) of certain 
institutions. Furthermore, we also found that not all strategies may be employed by the same 
actor; for instance, vesting and advocacy were largely done for the consultants by the state. 
These findings lend weight to Zietsma and McKnight’s (2009) point that several groups may 
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cooperate in their institutional work efforts to create a particular institution. Thus, the 
creation of an institution is a complex process in which a variety of agents are involved and 
the question of whether and how the presence of cooperating or competing actors with 
different power resources will affect the kind of change that happens to an institution may be 
crucial for understanding the dynamics of the different forms of institutional work. Our 
research also points to the need for a more complex analysis of the web of relationships 
between institutional work strategies at different levels of analysis—individual, occupational, 
and/or organizational. 
 
Our exploration of ERC services occurs at the point of their emergence as a separate and 
growing professional service. Therefore, we do not exclude the possibility of an alternative 
path in their future development. Exploration of the development of this service in future may 
also be interesting for understanding the experiences of the new ‘generation’ of consultants. 
Further examination of other stakeholders in the field and theorizing their role in relation to 
the development of this service also remains an avenue for further research. Remuneration 
consultancy currently remains situated mainly within PSFs and therefore it would be 
interesting to understand more clearly why and when a newly formed service continues to 
‘reside’ within PSFs and under what conditions it may separate. In this respect, examining the 
growth of ‘boutique’ ERC firms may be a fruitful avenue for future research. Finally, 
professional and organizational structures vary cross culturally (see Svensson and Evetts 
2010). It would be interesting to apply this analysis to explore ERC services in different 
cultural contexts. With the globalizing executive market understanding the development of 
ERC in different national contexts and the ways in which such developments impact the 
broader national and international executive pay arrangements promises to be an interesting 
exploration. 
 
In conclusion, this article has explored the new professional project of ERC through the lens 
of institutional work. In doing so, it strengthens the empirical foundations of the 
institutionalist approach to understanding professionalism (Scott, 2008; Leicht and Fennel 
2006; Muzio, Brock, and Suddaby 2013) as well as adds to our knowledge of how the 
emergence of this new professional services is linked to broader processes of field-level 
transformations (Suddaby and Viale 2011). Our study draws attention to the importance of a 
multi-level and contextual analysis of institutional work in order to produce a more nuanced 
understanding of contemporary professionalism which moves beyond the focus on monopoly. 
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NOTES 
1. The concept of a profession is highly debated (see Evetts 2011). In this paper we use the 
term ‘profession’ to refer to ‘traditional’ or ‘liberal’ professions (see Reed 1996). We use 
the terms ‘professional occupation’ and ‘professional service’ to refer to the new less 
established knowledge-intensive occupations which have developed within larger PSFs, 
such as executive remuneration. 
2. Professional project is typically defined as a more or less systematic collective endeavour 
of an occupational group to translate resources into social and economic rewards (Larson 
1977).  
3. Lawrence and Suddaby (2006: 248) suggest that it is possible to take a broad view of 
institutions as existing across levels ‘from micro-institutions in groups and organizations 
that regulate forms of interaction among members, to field-level institutions such as those 
associated with professions and industries, to societal institutions such as family, gender, 
religion etc’. By ‘institution’, we refer here to a set of shared rules and practices that shape 
the behaviour of a field (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006: 248). 
4. Data compiled from Morningstar Intelligence and Annual Reports by the authors. Reliable 
data on the use of consultants is only available since 2002 when disclosure became 
compulsory (DRRR 2002).  
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